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1. Living the margins. A criminal reconstruction of sociality
Criminal practices in the context of modern states are generally under- 
stood as acts against government, society and morality. The organizational structure 
of criminal institutions appears not only to be concealed from the state and from 
recognised civil society, but it is by its nature against any legal code or public con- 
cept of good. Legalistic discourse considers outlaws as the most striking expression 
of incompatibility with the state, and therefore fails to represent outlaws in the way 
they are actually rooted in communities and in society: criminals work outside any 
social and political framework, and especially outside value-driven motivations. If 
this perspective aims to confine the criminal to the role of reproducer of social 
marginality from one side, from the other it implicitly recognises the criminal as 
product of this social marginality. Outlaws gain their official visibility as pure agents 
of destruction only through the antagonism and security policies the state imple- 
ments against them (Cohen 1993; Ferrel 1995; Dal Lago 2010). This misjudgement 
is not due to the lack of importance these organizations have in shaping various 
forms of governance, but because they do this in spite of and beyond the state, in 
socio-economical and geographical spaces where the state does not operate organi- 
cally (Edelbacher et al. 2015). This is particularly clear in areas where state govern- 
ance is strikingly absent or conniving, dramatically fostering the direct emergence of 
alternative monopolies based on violence. Here these criminal organizations, often 
redefined through the construct of ‘terrorism’, become para-institutions explicitly 
recognised as political organisms, with a juridical system, a social organization and 
economic network alternative to the formal authority and economy. 
On the other hand, the legalistic discourse often implicitly continues to la- 
bel formal activities legitimate without questioning this label, even if such activities 
can be perceived by local populations as illicit and immoral. The same narrative al- 
1 This paper was based on a piece of research already partly discussed in June 2017 in Cardiff, during 
the 4th European Workshops in International Studies, within the panel ‘The good, the bad and the ugly. 
Exploring Boundaries between the Informal, the Criminal and the Immoral’. I would especially like 
to thank the anonymous informants who contributed to my preliminary research. I am grateful to 
Martina Belluto, Francesco Gervasi, Giap Parini, Alessandra Russo and Hans Van der Veen for their 
feedback. I am also grateful for the comments from the anonymous reviewers of IdPS. 
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lows (for example) some companies, who are institutionally based in the realm of 
the legitimate global economy and complex governance, to create exploitative struc- 
tures far from the perceived public interest and equally grounded on the monopoly 
of violence; for instance, by hiring private military services or by corrupting public 
authorities (Bayart et al. 1999; Avant 2005; Pearce 2012). Even where the authority 
of the state is undisputed or barely criticized, the erosion of resources and govern- 
ability, in addition to the rushing of uncontrolled global flows of capital, goods, 
technology, and people, has created forms of ‘disordered legality’ in which multiple 
ideas of legitimacy, besides the one made legitimate, may reign in the gaps (Palidda 
2000; Comaroff & Comaroff 2006; Ong 2006). 
The neoliberal pattern has in this sense a role. The increasing flexibility of 
capitals and the unaccountability of a market-regulated state on the forms of social 
reproduction, generates radical forms of social fragmentation and segments of sub- 
altern or rejected population. Their devaluation in terms of labour force and ability 
to enter the circuits of capital enhancement matches with the erosion of their legal 
identity of citizens to whom safety, rights and political representation are granted 
(Stenson 2000; Harvey 2005; Greenhouse 2010). These political vacuums are there- 
fore open to become operative grey zones, where illegal activities can be some of 
the main sources of subsistence and criminals can take advantage of a favourable 
business environment (González de la Rocha 2006; Pratesi et al. 2014). In this way, 
neoliberism blurs the lines between legal and illegal, opening doors to the prolifera- 
tion of shadow economies, but also shadow legality and moralities; alternative social 
construction and cultural models whose growth and importance do not allow a 
simplistic condemnation. Criminals become active actors within a complex system 
in which informality, criminality and social needs cooperate, and even the explicitly 
illegal world, theoretically antagonistic with the state, enjoys – at least for macro- 
structural, but usually also operative reasons – areas of tolerance, connivance and 
collusion. 
This overlapping of different sovereignties changes the meaning of the 
concept of criminal justice. Even criminals, leaders of an alternative virtue, have 
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room in the everyday practice to define their own concept of justice and to build 
public channels of self-representation and self-promotion. In the area of Naples, in 
the early 80s, a new and powerful criminal organization emerged (after the slaughter 
of its opponents) by the management of an environmental disaster – the earth- 
quake in Irpinia – the New Organized Camorra (NCO). Its charismatic leader was 
Raffaele Cutolo, also named ‘O Professore [the Professor] or ‘O Vangelo [the Gospel], 
able to direct and reproduce the organization from prison. Within the NCO, groups 
of guappi di rione colla molletta [knife-armed local thugs], namely ‘men of honour’ en- 
gaged in smuggling and control of farmers markets, became a para-military group 
that controlled the local economy, branched like a holding and linked to the most 
important financial and political Italian lobbies of that time (Di Fiore 2005; Bar- 
bagallo 2011). In 1982, his sister and assistant Rosalina Cutolo invited a state televi- 
sion journalist in the lavish Medici Castle of their property. She let him wander 
around to ask locals what they thought of her brother, bragging about his power 
and claiming he had always done many good deeds and always thought about the 
common well-being; for instance, by having the city mayor find a job for an unfor- 
tunate family man.2 
2. Visions of power and legitimising rhetoric. Criminal morality as a collec- 
tive representation 
While not underestimating the cultural variations in treating image and 
codifying its deep meanings, we will tap into some visuals drawn from two different 
contexts where organized crime has notoriously been in the spotlight, to the point 
that both contexts are stereotypically associated worldwide with the criminal world, 
also in the form of related visual stereotypes. One is the Mexican context of drug- 
trafficking cartels and urban crime, the other that of Southern Italy, with a differen- 
tiated panorama of regional mafias which, although less visible than it was at the 
time of kidnappings and civil murders, are still ingrained not only in collective imag- 
2 ‘Rosalina and Raffaele Cutolo’, video extracted from G. Marazzo’s reportages (RAI, Italy, 
1974–1981), Vimeo, 05/06/2017, viewed 15/07/2018, www.vimeo.com/220302166 [Video 
1]. 
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ination, but also in national and transnational, legal and illegal, economies. In both 
contexts, criminal organizations are engaged in supporting an alternative morality 
that lowers the cultural barriers to the contamination with illegal and criminal activi- 
ties and makes them able to affect social interactions on different levels. 
To inquire into criminal consent-building mechanisms we will draw on 
techniques stemming from visual anthropology. As a transmission  process  of 
shared codes between the observed, the represented and those that are interpreting 
its symbolic content, images are a powerful tool for representing the collective im- 
aginary, and at the same time for constructing its social and cultural attributes (Belt- 
ing 2016; Ricœur & Castoriadis 2016). Far from being the mere art of mystification 
and ornaments, rhetorical procedures form part of the logic in production of 
meaning, deeply affecting and reflecting the construction of social relations. We can 
therefore observe how the media circulation of criminal images takes part in this 
representational negotiation (Hayward & Presdee 2010) and in the struggle for a 
cultural hegemony, conveying and legitimating power relations, values and sense of 
belonging. The perspective adopted puts together the discursive regimes and the so- 
cial practices that make their construction possible, being at the same time oriented 
by them. Rhetoric appears through these lenses as a precious instrument for ob- 
serving cultural products in relation to the emerging, organizing and naturalising of 
social patterns and subjectivities. 
The present paper was developed with the objective of providing a formal 
and functional description of these rhetorical procedures in two regional contexts. 
Visuals here included have been selected as exemplary from a collection of around 
300 images and 100 videos (musical videoclips included), collected from previous 
journalistic, documentary and academic works, and from a survey of the presence 
of these visuals in blogs, websites and social media pages. The research of visuals 
was thus mainly conducted online, but has been enriched and expanded through 
some informal interviews carried out in the attempt to evaluate the presence of 
these cultural products in the local mediascapes. The observation is based on visuals 
related to criminal organizations or directly performed by criminals. Both in terms 
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of their number and selection criteria, and consistently with the aims of the work, 
they do not constitute a sample. Especially for the second category, visuals are in- 
tended to be a means for allowing a partial view of a molecular and informal circu- 
lation on which we lack any statistical affordable data. The paper does not have the 
aim of developing a punctual comparative research on two areas that, even without 
mentioning their respective historical and cultural peculiarities, have two extremely 
complex and plural criminal scenarios, both largely debated in academia. Nonethe- 
less, the criminal organizations to which visuals refer have some similarities in their 
local political contexts, entered the global market as business partners and occupy, 
from the structural point of view, comparable social fields. These organizations 
emerged from different but comparable social asymmetries and are reinforced by a 
marginality of subaltern groups that, in both cases, we can observe reflected in the 
distribution of what Hannertz (1992) defined as ‘social organization of meaning’. 
Furthermore, they move within two democratic institutional systems which, while 
maintaining their political hegemony, leave to the underworld of informality, includ- 
ed the illicit one, relevant occasions for political importance (Toranzo Roca 1997; 
Rey et al. 2017). 
Observing criminal rhetoric through the circulation of visuals could make 
them a possible contact point between approaches encouraged by the theory of so- 
cial fields and those encouraged by the theory of political discourse (Bourdieu 1997; 
Laclau 2014). Visuals are indeed repulsive to an ontological distinction between 
practice and signification. The power and immediacy of images are not separated 
from codes and procedures that build their multiple levels of significance, and their 
operational value relies precisely on being a rhetorical device able to define an in- 
action model of reality. As soon as they become visible, their symbolic content be- 
comes an instrument for establishing relationships and identities (Barthes 1964; 
Freedberg 1989; Augé 1997). 
In Mexican history, images, especially religious ones, have been essential in 
absorbing and reshaping different cultural traditions throughout the centuries, 
building a new moral and political dimension (Gruzinzki 1988). Even for current 
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criminal groups, iconic representation remains an essential practice of power legiti- 
misation, to the point of using it in explicit advertisement strategies (Campbell 
2003; Voeten 2012). The same applies to Italian criminal organizations that – more 
or less devoted to exposing themselves publicly – still need a social context that 
acknowledges their power in order to operate effectively (Zagnoli 1984; Armao 
2000). We will try to categorise some iconographic examples drawn from these con- 
texts along the lines of three different rhetorical procedures: the legitimisation of 
outlawed power through criminal humanisation, through his mythologisation and 
sanctification. 
3. The rhetoric of Humanisation
The first images attributed to organized crime are images of killings, vio- 
lence and fear, reasonably acts of ‘inhumanity’. The first ideological challenge for 
criminals along their process of legitimisation is therefore to challenge the cultural 
paradigms that define what is ‘human’. It is possible to identify two different proce- 
dures, as much antagonistic as complementary: the first one consists of taking over 
the culturally accepted definition of humanity and linking criminality to it; the sec- 
ond is defining a different kind of humanity, a criminal humanity made legitimate. 
Figure 1. Commemorating Emanuele Sibillo. 
Source: www.youtube.com 
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In the first movement, criminals aim to associate themselves with a code 
of common morality that is widespread and rooted in the reference society. They 
aim to be recognised as men of honour, where honour is in this case to be inter- 
preted in connection to local traditions, to shared and sedimented values. Criminals 
seek to look like ‘one of us’ and, even better, they present themselves as the men 
who make ‘us’ possible. Among many others, we choose as an example of the first 
case a commemorative video spread online in 2015, dedicated to a young Camorra 
boss killed by his competitors. In this photo collection, opened by the message of 
his brother and successor, Emanuele Sibillo is represented surrounded by his family, 
wife and friends: fragments of a daily familiar life in Naples (Fig. 1).3 Furthermore, 
people who are behind cruel intimidation, murders and resource exploitation, are 
the same people who offer employment opportunities to disgraced segments of the 
population. For instance, Camorra is known for having set up a system of subsidies 
for families of inmates, to whom is guaranteed not only a salary, but also study 
grants to worthy sons (especially for those who would become lawyers). The same 
applies to the Calabrian ’Ndrangheta, although it generally operates off the radar, 
structured by family clans already founded on close blood ties. 
Both organizations are not only part of the global world of legal jobs – 
managing recruitments and enterprises – but also of the local cultural politics, fund- 
ing popular festivals, cultural and religious events and, in the case of Naples, sup- 
porting young singers from working-class neighbourhoods. Crime fighting is then 
reinterpreted as an antagonism to local society, its normality and morality. For ex- 
ample, on the occasion of the visit to Locri of the Italian President Mattarella 
(March 2017), the city was filled with graffiti against authorities. One of these, lo- 
cated near the bishop’s residence and directed against a priest engaged in anti-mafia 
associations, invoked ‘more work less cops’ (Fig. 2).4 
3 ‘Emanuele Sibillo E.S. 17 – È PER TE’, YouTube page ‘Io fake’, 09/11/2015, viewed 
15/07/2018, https://youtu.be/LWWHXyLlxWc [Video 2]. 
4 Candito  A,  ‘Mafie,  a  Locri  scritte  contro  don  Ciotti  e  gli  “sbirri”’,  La  Repubblica, 
20/03/2017. 
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Figure 2. Graffiti against Don Ciotti in Locri. 
Source: www.larepubblica.it 
Many Mexican cartels are devoted to sensationalized acts of philanthropy. 
Narco-charity supports a humanising propaganda among those who are generally 
ignored by the government, hence providing a legitimating frame for their unique 
form of upward social mobility: outlawed practices. During a recent Three Kings’ 
Day (January 6) in Oaxaca, shrines filled with toys mysteriously appeared among 
some of the poorest communities of the region, with signs explaining that they 
were left ‘so that people can see that the last letter, Z, supports noble people’ (Fig. 
3).5 On the other side of the country, in Tamaulipas, the Cártel del Golfo sent pre- 
sents for children, each toy tagged with a sticker: ‘Perseverance, discipline and effort 
are the basis for success. Keep studying to be a great example. Happy Children’s 
Day. With all my warmth for tomorrow’s triumphant one. Your friend’.6 The moral 
lesson was signed by the already imprisoned Osiel Cárdenas Guillén, known as El 
Mata Amigos [The Friend-Killer] because he became a drug lord by killing a strict 
partner, other than recruiting members of the Mexican Army Special Forces. 
5 ‘Presuntos  Zetas  regalan  juguetes  por  Día  de  Reyes’,  SDP  Noticias,  06/01/2014, 
www.sdpnoticias.com. 
6 Cohen R, ‘Trends in Narco-Charity’, 15/01/2014, www.nonprofitquarterly.org. 
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Figure 3. Gifts by the Los Zetas cartel in Oaxaca. 
Source: Twitter profile, available on www.sdpnoticias.com 
In addition to actions themselves, a highly effective form of moral promo- 
tion is the media spreading of these acts through visuals, especially when they reach 
the population in an apparently involuntary and informal way. Again, from 
Taumalipas, a video spread through social networks showed the drug dealers visiting 
schools, hospitals, nursing homes, and poor neighbourhoods, offering money and 
the traditional Epiphany cake (with the national flag on the top) to children.7 
The dissemination of videos, photos, and messages is usually launched by social 
network profiles linked to narco-trafficking or by the population itself, but they can 
also appear on press reports and televised news. The system of narco-charity, de- 
spite the bloodthirsty regime the cartels have established in Mexico, allows them to 
stimulate sympathy and foster the recruitment of new criminals in urban ghettos 
and among the rural population. 
In these examples, criminal agents do not challenge the dominant para- 
digm of humanity, but represent themselves in actions that are perceived positively 
7 ‘Cártel del Golfo y Los Zetas reparten roscas de Reyes en Tamaulipas’; original video de- 
leted, partially visible as tv news on YouTube, available on Vimeo, 05/06/2017, viewed 
15/07/2018, www.vimeo.com/220397234 [Video 3]. 
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according to the dominant paradigm, like welfare provisions. On the other hand, 
criminal organizations can use visuals not to blend themselves with people, but as 
elements for distinction. Outlaws can create and promote a different human model, 
usually supported by an alternative strong set of codes, rites and myths. In the mal- 
leable context of a fragmented society, this model builds a strong organic communi- 
ty and promotes an alternative social order in which criminals recognise themselves. 
The new moral values can even be subject to juridical codification, as in the case of 
the decalogue of Rights and duties written by the mafia boss Salvatore Lo Piccolo.8 
Furthermore, these values promote the external recognition of criminal distinctive- 
ness. The picture of a secret society led by an esoteric sense of justice gives a big 
contribution to the social acceptance of criminal organizations (Grattieri & Nicaso 
2009; Parini 2009). A central role in the construction of the group is often played 
by an extreme but regulated use of violence. The liminality between de- 
humanisation and re-humanisation of criminals is often managed through radical 
rituals of redefinition, up to the extreme example of cannibalism in some Mexican 
cartel.9 
Besides the group solidity, a rhetoric of distinction also allows a phenom- 
enological redefinition of each criminal experience, a new identity and subjectivity. 
Recruitments for example pass from initiation rituals with a strong aesthetic dimen- 
sion. Visual elements and body postures work as a rhetorical device on subject’s 
predisposition, empowerment and transformation (Csordas 1984). For example, a 
complex performance is the ritual baptism of the ’Ndrangheta, an organization 
whose name comes probably from the Greek andraghatos, valiant man. During the 
oath for making a giovane d’onore [honourable boy] a picciotto – the first level of the 
criminal hierarchy – the ’Ndrangheta members make use of ritually prepared spaces, 
religious formulas, blood exchanges, the half-burning of a St Michael the Archan- 
gel’s image and the declaiming by the boss of parabolas about mythological knight- 
8 ‘Il decalogo mafioso di Lo Piccolo’, LaRepubblica Immagini, 09/11/2007, 
www.repubblica.it/2006/05/gallerie. 
9 ‘Denuncian canibalismo narco: sicarios mexicanos prepararían platos típicos con la carne 
de sus víctimas’, Publimetro, 19/07/2017, www.publimetro.cl. 
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ed ancestors (Faeta & Lombardi Satriani 1983; Grattieri & Nicaso 2009). Tattooing 
among criminals is an off-the-book historical practice spread across several parts of 
the world; through tattoos criminal humanity is directly drawn on the body. The 
body – the first ruled space in which the symbols and their effect on reality are em- 
bodied – is a perfect medium for images that mark an identity, a public image, an 
alternative humanness in act. In Italian criminal organizations, in particular between 
low-level affiliates, tattoos are called devozione [devotion]. According to tradition, 
they should be raw or self-made tattoos done in prison and they should indicate 
through symbols the outlaw’s condition, his status and affiliation. Examples include 
the aforementioned Saint protector or logos, like a crown, a red rose, the Ace of 
clubs of the Neapolitan playing cards (mainly among local leaders) (Fig. 4, 5, 6).10
Figure 4. The call by St. Michael the Archangel. Figure 5. Ace of clubs. 
Source: OMICRON – 
Osservatorio milanese sulla criminalità organizzata al Nord, 
‘I tatuaggi rituali della ‘ndrangheta nel racconto 
del collaboratore emiliano’, 28/12/2015, 
<www.omicronweb.it> 
Source: Informal circulation 
10 Capobastone is also the name of Andrangheta’s local bosses. 
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Figure 6. Sacred crown. 
Source: Carbonara, C. 2014, ‘Rapine ai tir, 14 persone arrestate’, Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 23 
October, www.corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it 
Symbolism shapes the forms of display of power and criminal ability. The 
secret meaning of these conventional signals (Gambetta 2009) is acquired as much as 
the human and social capital necessary to be coherent with a collective identity and 
competitive in the criminal labour market. The rhetoric of distinction follows the 
structural reconfigurations of today’s criminality even on body inscriptions. The Ca- 
morra after Cutolo, for example, from a pseudo-monopolistic organization entangled 
with politics has turned into a ‘Camorra dust’, a multipolar criminal reality composed 
by more than 20 clans, fighting for the territorial control and adapted to the fluidity 
of the new local-global political context (Ciconte 2008). Tattoos become therefore a 
branding phenomenon, in which employers’ bodies directly show – besides some ste- 
reotypes of ghetto culture and other elements of moral legitimisation, like honour or 
familial love – the names of bosses and the aesthetic of the clan (Fig. 7, 8). The same 
happens among Mexican cartels, with different tattoos indicating affiliation and reli- 
gious devotion (Fig. 9). Some tattoos are also associated with political symbols, like 
Pancho Villa the revolutionary on the back of El Cholo, one of the main hitmen of 
Los Zetas, to clearly define the political role he attributes to himself (Fig. 10). The 
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maras, the criminal urban gangs all over Central America, use tattoos pervasively, 
which not only permanently defines their individual outlaw status, but also trans- 
forms them into a group of ‘signalling bodies’, street diaries which help to delineate 
affiliations and territories (Zúñiga 2008) (Fig. 11). 
Figure 7-8. Criminal tattoos in Naples. 
Source: Corriere del Mezzogiorno 2016, ‘Tatuaggi con i morti e armi nella cintola, la faida infini- 
ta delle micro-gang di Napoli’, 06 September, <www.corrieredelmezzogiorno.corriere.it>. 
Figure 9. ‘Guadalupe 
Vàzquez’. 
Figure 10. The arrest of 
El Cholo (2007). 
Figure 11. ‘El Recio’ [M13 
former leader]. 
Source: Photo by Arias G. 
In Hernandez (2016) 
Source: Narcotic News, 
www.narcoticnews.com 




Davide N. Carnevale, Criminal humanitarianism. A visual exploration of criminal legitimisation, between 
alternative moralities and the political vacuum. 
Practices of distinction also emerge in the wider social context, where they 
become part of the foundation, promotion and attempted sedimentation of a new 
alternative value system. The strongest naturalization of the criminal social figure 
here takes place through the legitimisation of his illegality and even of violence. 
The groups of narcos more involved in narco-charity, like Los Zetas, are also 
known for being the most cold-blooded. They use violence in equally spectacular- 
ized forms, with executions, murders and tortures exposed to the public and fiercely 
shown on the media. The murders intentionally promoted are meant to set an ex- 
ample, in which the fundamental correctness of the punishment is claimed. In some 
cases, they even explicitly award themselves the title of enactors of Divine Justice, 
like in the case of a suspected rapist’s torture and crucifixion in Michoacan, which 
happened in 2012 after his kidnapping from a police car.11 A radical de-humanising 
violence is applied also in killings among criminal competitors, in which the need to 
promote themselves as the successful brand – the good criminals – is associated 
with the extreme repudiation of competitors (Fig. 12, 13). 
Figure 12. Execution. 
Source: Sinembargo Magazine, www.sinembargo.mx 
11 Bunker R, ‘Mexican Cartel Tactical Note #13: Man Crucified in Michoacán, Mexico’, 
Small Wars Journal, 09/10/2012, www.smallwarsjournal.com. 
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Possibly more than in narco-charity, sensationalistic murders and criminal 
messages are diffused by the official media, with an ambiguous combination of re- 
porting duty and media support for criminal propaganda. Javier Valdez (2016), 
murdered in May 2017, is among the last to denounce this phenomenon, together 
with the widespread collusion between 
narco-traffic  and  State  departments. 
Another example of a murder turned 
into a show is that of  an activist in 
Taumalipas, where the killers hacked 
the Twitter profile of  the victim by 
publishing  a  picture  of  her  corpse 
along with intimidating messages (Fig. 
14). Suffering bodies thus play an ac- 
tive role in the construction of a soci- 
etal narrative opposed to legalistic dis- 
course,  and  in  the  elaboration  of  a 
criminal necroculture and necropolitics 
(Artaud  1970;  Reiner  2002;  Fuentes 
Figure 13. Narcos on Twitter. 
Source: www.twitter.com
Diaz 2012). As several studies show (Sontag 2003; Farmer 2005), violent images 
hardly bring a thoughtful consideration to the observed act; on the contrary, suffer- 
ing bodies do not make the structural aspect of violence visible, paradoxically ob- 
scuring moral responsibilities and naturalizing the message violence seeks to legiti- 
mate. The executions appear as playful ceremonies, celebratory even when blood- 
thirsty, and the show is seductive, making the observer ambiguously repulsed by 
something in which he remains involved (Debord 1967; Cavarero 2007). 
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Figure 14. Narcos on Twitter. 
Source: www.twitter.com 
Not only does the legitimation of criminals take place through violence 
and fear – direct manifestation of their power – but the messages associated with 
executions also frame the act in terms of justice, appealing to the observer’s moral 
support. Far from being a problem for legitimacy, the media diffusion of inhuman 
images can be considered the endpoint in the rhetorical process of criminal human- 
isation. On the Mexican social networks, it is not particularly surprising to see a pe- 
culiar Mannequin challenge circulating amongst the viral videos. Instead of portray- 
ing ordinary people remaining frozen in some social life moment, it offers the scene 
– it is not clear if real or a simulacrum (Baudrillard 1981) – of an execution; the
soundtrack is the polka rhythm of a narco-corrido (Fig. 15).12 
12 ‘Mannequin challenge de Tamaulipas’, online videoclip from a Twitter profile; available 
on Vimeo, 05/06/2017, viewed 15/07/2018, www.vimeo.com/220299631 [Video 4]. 
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 Source: www.twitter.com 
Figure 15. Mannequin challenge 
This alternative mo- 
rality becomes a new cultural 
reference framework, whose el- 
ements (dress codes, languages, 
systems of belief, aesthetic ex- 
pressions and so on) start to 
appear – not only among lower 
classes – folkloric, pop and at- 
tractive, representative and ef- 
fective in the real social con- 
texts of living and surviving. 
But especially – here the two 
rhetorical movements comple- 
ment each other – no longer 
very far from normal. Outlaws 
are ready to become idols. 
4. The rhetoric of Mythologization
Myth structures foundational beliefs of social groups through a narrative 
frame in which the acts of de-historicized figures make them culturally recognised 
(Ries 1978). For criminals that strive to become an efficient and legitimate – both 
internally and externally – power, these tales about reality are of course an im- 
portant device, that we can observe in deep in visual productions. 
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Figure 16-17. Aesthetics of power on Twitter. 
Source: www.twitter.com 
A first mythological process taps directly into the reality of violence and 
the condition of risk, and associates criminals with models of success. In contexts 
of insecurity the criminal’s aesthetic is that of the winner, and the outlaw becomes 
an attractive figure by simply representing himself through the symbols of his crim- 
inal capabilities, richness and power (Fig. 16, 17). The rhetoric of distinction does 
not hinder representations of this suitability. The hero can expose his criminal fea- 
tures while represented as harmonically merged within the local environment. In the 
recent videoclip Mafia by the Algerian-German rapper Eazy Padrino, the ex-con 
Gianfranco Prencipe plays with the gun with his village in Puglia as a background.13 
The outlaw’s mythology is nevertheless connected to heroic behaviour and 
positive attitudes, like temerity, bravery, loyalty, manliness, honourability. Honour is 
often representing in this case the adherence to the criminal culture’s values, in op- 
position to those of the official institutions (Gratteri & Nicaso 2008). In criminal 
tales, the latter are seen as an hypocritical or corrupt power, often tied to the figures 
of the colonist, the exploiter or the privileged owner, both in the Mexican case – 
where the outlaw is opposed to the gringo – and in the Italian case – where the mafio- 
13 ‘Mafia’,  song  by  Eazy  Padrino  (2018),  Youtube,  07/06/2018,  viewed  15/07/2018, 
www.youtu.be/1HZduDCm8sk [Video 5]. 
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so presents himself both as member of the onorata società [honoured society] and as a 
revolutionary son of the People. 
The legitimising idiom of Italian organizations has stimulated, for instance, 
an identity-making intimacy between the criminals’ anti-statism and the historical 
phenomena of lower classes’ resilience in Southern Italy. The Camorra members 
refer to a rose-tinted image of the guappo, which for example has been presented in 
the cathartic sceneggiata of Mario Merola, a Neapolitan singer and actor (Fig. 20). In 
these dramas, notoriously beloved for example by the former Camorra boss Michele 
Zaza, the guappo is more an informal lawgiver than a local racketeer. He uses vio- 
lence as a chivalric masculine act of justice, which helps to re-establish an equilibri- 
um in a community formerly challenged by infamy or betrayal (Ravveduto & Amato 
2007; Marmo 2011). ’Ndrangheta usually refers to the banditry of the late nine- 
teenth century, even if the folkloric image of the brigante is here used to denote a 
parasitic economy in which, unlike the image of the hidden bandit, violence is usu- 
ally not directed towards dominant political antagonists. The criminal project thus 
finds a wide local acceptance because it seems to intercept a promise of emancipa- 
tion culturally rooted among populations which have seen themselves as exploited 
or excluded from the economic development and modernization (Mangiameli 1989; 
Parini 2009). These types of narratives can change reference points and centrality, 
according to the social role criminal organizations are assuming and which ap- 
proach, from connivance to conflict, is mutually adopted in the relation with gov- 
ernment agents and big exponents of the formal economy. 
The mythologizing processes directly promoted by organizations and in- 
tended for the external public generally combine the criminal’s self-representations 
with a wide circulation of – formal, informal and illegal – cultural products. If in 
the neo-traditionalist invention of corridos the deeds and the wars amongst Mexican 
drug lords are sung, the songs about Neapolitan lowlife paint a reality in which the 
criminal is in some cases a hero ‘cursed by life’, the individual warrior fighting for 
the good of the common people, in others a ‘one of us’ character included in dra- 
mas with a traditional flavor: love stories and heartbreaking betrayals, set in poor 
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urban communities buttressed by customs and neighbourhood solidarity 
(Ravveduto & Amato 2007; Giletti Benso 2014). The good sentiments of petty 
criminals, here often represented, create a bridging culture where illegality is allowed 
for surviving, to help families or allowing the wellbeing of the community to pre- 
vail.14 This cultural production and its audience are often short-range. Local musical 
managers, sometimes connected to criminal organizations, nurture local stars which, 
besides selling their music on the official and more often pirated music market 
(both now in transformation), play at parties, weddings, and write songs more or 
less directly celebrating criminal leaders, even on commission; the same holds for 
Mexican corridos. In some cases, as the one of Tommy Parisi, the singer himself is a 
member of criminal organization, actually the son of one of the most important 
local bosses of Bari (Fig. 18). 
Figure 18. Tommy Parisi. Figure 20. Mario Merola interpreting don Salvatore Savastano in a polizziottesco. 
Source: www.tommyparisi.fan-club.it, TV 
screenshot 
Figure 19. Vite perdute. 
Source: www.youtube.com Source: Napoli... serenata calibro 9’, Brescia (dir) 1978, movie poster. 
14 ‘O’ Scippo’ [The mugging], song by Nino D’angelo (1976), YouTube, 12/10/2012, viewed 
15/07/2018, https://youtu.be/m4idmuqainY [Video 6]. 
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Especially in the most recent videoclip, both the sung stories and the sing- 
ers’ performances underline their character of individual celebrities. For the under- 
employed Neapolitans that inhabit the wide ‘contact zone’ with the criminal econ- 
omy, musical career means redemption from anonymity and poverty. Honour be- 
came in this sense synonymic with success: the main model of honour neomelodic 
stars represent is the success of gaining ‘a personal sovereignty achieved in the en- 
trepreneurial art of making do’ (Pine 2008, p. 207). For their fans, singers create an 
imagined community; the fragile belonging to a political citizenship is replaced by 
belonging to a neoliberal identity: being an audience linked to the consumption of 
cultural products (Giusto & Russo 2017). Furthermore, neomelodic songs offer a 
device of mutual and tolerant recognition of a field of shared informal/illicit prac- 
tices. They build what Jason Pine called ‘affective community’, giving emotional 
sense to the contradiction of living thanks to a criminal network that is at the same 
time a resource and a source of terror. If the local artistic production allows for ex- 
tremely effective forms of identification, nonetheless the criminal imaginary enters 
mass culture and non-criminal production (Fig. 21, 22). Both the Italian mafias and 
the Mexican cartels have become an attractive commercial brand, a source of artis- 
tic inspiration and profits at several levels (Gratteri & Nicaso 2008; Campbell 2014). 
The same criminals make the public of these more or less plausible products, which 
trigger a continuous game of mirrors. The picture of the new Camorra made in the 
successful series Gomorra in recent years has also influenced criminal productions. 
The videoclip Onore e dignità [Honour and dignity] by the young singer Vincenzo 
Mosca, for example, clearly reflects the aesthetics of Gomorra; the song probably has 
also a privileged recipient, sending a coded warning to someone recently arrested.15
15 ‘Onore  e  dignità’  [Honour  and  dignity],  song  by  Vincenzo  Mosca  (2016),  YouTube, 
13/12/2016, viewed 15/07/2018, https://youtu.be/iXQVikkXpbI [Video 7]. 
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Figure 21. Gomorra’s personality test. Figure 22. El Chapo T-shirt. 
Source: www.facebook.com Source: www.amazon.com 
The single identity of criminal and the recurrent aspects of a mythic ‘crim- 
inalness’ are often tied in criminal biographies. This can be observed, for example, 
from their forms of self-representation on social networks. A Sicilian boss high- 
lights his tough apprenticeship in life sharing on Facebook some images from the 
pages Il Bandito Imprigionato [The imprisoned Bandit] and La Legge della Strada [The 
Street Law] (Fig. 23). Another well-known exponent of the of Cosa Nostra, Franco 
Mormina – a.k.a. Monello [Cheeky] – whilst not forgetting to reaffirm the ideal of 
omertà, in a reversal of roles uses a well-known brand of ‘Italian- ness’ – Nutella – in 
order to define politicians as the real criminals (Fig. 24). The so-called ‘victims of 
justice’ are also usually mythologized, like inmates or old-fashioned criminals, as in 
the case of ‘Il mitico Mastro Ciccio’ [Master Ciccio the mythical], a video extracted 
from the documentary Uomini d’onore [Men of honour] by Francesco Sbano.16 
16 ‘Il Mitico “Mastro Ciccio”, affiliato della ndrangheta’, from the movie ‘Uomini d’onore’ 
(Sbano 2009), YouTube, 19/07/2012, viewed 15/07/2018, https://youtu.be/39j5n5vFN-c 
[Video 8]. 
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Figure 23 (a,b) – 24 (a,b). Cosa Nostra on Facebook. 
Source: Borrometi, P 2015, ‘I nuovi boss 2.0’, blog post, La spia, 21 April, viewed 
15/07/2018, <www.laspia.it> 
The supreme law of honour remains the main moralising element of crim- 
inal behaviour, and betrayal of honour is a constant negative presence in criminal 
parables. The repentant – which is for the State the symbol of a reconnection with 
legal order – is for criminal ideology the perfect antagonist. He is not only the su- 
preme representation of injustice and immorality, but the responsible of a general 
crumbling of social bonds. Among many others, a very explicit example is the song 
Vite Perdute [Lost lives] by Gianni Celeste. The videoclip tells the story of the de- 
struction of a family devoted to racket, awakened in the midst of the night by a po- 
lice raid: the father is a mafia boss, personified by Gianni Celeste himself, and his 
Sbano is known also as the successful producer of  ‘La musica della mafia’ (2000), a music 
compilation of Calabria’s criminal songs. 
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arrest has been made possible by his brother’s betrayal (Fig. 19).17 Even if some sig- 
nals point out that the new criminal generations have not the same appreciation to- 
wards the semitonal melisma, the same topic is still up-to-date outside the local me- 
diascapes and in the really recent news. An elderly boss of the Sacra Corona Unita 
in Mesagne (Puglia) for example, invited his own son, a repentant, to kill himself for 
having dishonoured the family. Published on Youtube, the video gains the approval 
of several users, who acknowledge credit to the boss and show respect for the old- 
school mafias.18 This invitation was then confirmed by the violent ostracism of his 
two other sons, doomed to shame after ‘decades of honourable resistance’ in jail.19 
A recurring mythologisation concerns charismatic criminal leaders. The 
criminal leaders mythologise themselves, when not engaged in denying their role 
and keeping a low profile, linking their rise to legendary victories and murders of 
powerful enemies and betrayers. Particularly well known is the public profile of El 
Chapo [The Shorty], one of the most famous leaders of the multi-billion-dollar 
Mexican cocaine-smuggling industry, El Cartel de Sinaloa. His audacity, his sensa- 
tional jailbreaks, and his meetings with important show-biz people regularly show 
up in videos, songs and television series (a script which the leader, currently in jail, 
declared that he would have preferred to amend).20 Amongst the Italian characters, 
besides the mythological abscondence of Totò ‘the Beast’ Riina, Raffaele Cutolo 
presented himself and was recognised nowadays as the symbol of a ‘right Camorra’, 
even if his organization was overthrown by a violent feud at the end of the 80s 
(Cutolo 1980; Rossi 1983; Di Fiore 2005). A successful house-music medley in- 
spired by a movie by Tornatore features some of Cutolo’s better known statements 
17 ‘Vite Perdute’ song by Gianni Celeste and Massimo (2011), Canzoni 'e mala - Vol. 2 - Compi- 
lation, CD, Seamusica; available on Youtube, 05/07/2011, viewed 15/07/2018, 
https://youtu.be/Epg6V5gc-gs [Video 9]. 
18 ‘I fratelli del pentito: ha disonorato la famiglia’, YouTube page ‘Senza Colonne’, 31/03/2014, 
viewed 15/07/2018, www.youtu.be/qf9zejp8O0k [Video 10]. 
19 ‘Mesagne e la SCU, 2 parte’, YouTube page ‘Telerama News’, 16/07/2012, viewed 
15/07/2018, www.youtu.be/krxkFa3Cfzg [Video 11]. 
20 ‘El “Chapo” quiere negociar con Netflix y Univisión serie sobre su vida’, La Prensa, 
26/05/2016, www.laprensa.hn. 
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and circulates among the discos of Campania. Ritmo de omertad contains the ritualis- 
tic speech for the initiation to the NCO’s adept, which many people sing by heart 
(Ravveduto & Amato 2007). A recurring leitmotif is, as we have already seen, that 
of the ‘Robin Hood mythology’. Although leaders of associations born as forms of 
self-enrichment and exploitation, these leaders present themselves as heroes of the 
most marginalised community, which they nurture and help. Cutolo defined himself 
as Robin Hood in a famous interview during one of his trials.21 He often claimed 
this intention and confirmed it in 2015, affirming that he ‘tried to re-establish the 
Reign of Naples, an independent social state where everybody would have had 
food’.22 El Chapo is also known for enjoying widespread popular support and now- 
adays there are frequent demonstrations for his release (Fig. 25). Narcos in Sinaloa 
(Fig. 26) are known for contributing to the construction of schools, roads, cemetery 
walls, churches, and for the distribution of scholarships. In different interviews the 
local population accuses the judicial intervention of having disrupted criminal good 
deeds, saying that ‘before, when things were quieter, the Cartel had more time for 
philanthropy’ (Sanchez & Jorge 2009; Sejias 2009). In the peripheries of Naples, re- 
cently, many riots took place during the arrests of some criminals.23 Therefore, the 
problem is not the presence of criminals but that of the State, which does not allow 
the criminals to act in a good way. 
21 ‘Raffaele Cutolo Evasion’, video extracted from G. Marazzo’s reportages (RAI, 1981), 
available on Vimeo, 05/06/2017, viewed 15/07/2018, www.vimeo.com/220302166 [Video 
12]. 
22 Berizzi P, ‘Raffaele Cutolo: “Io, sepolto vivo in una cella. Se esco io crolla il Parlamen- 
to”’, La Repubblica, 02/03/2015. 
23 Piedimonte S, ‘Boss in fuga chiede l’aiuto del quartiere. In cento contro i carabinieri con 
calci e sputi’, Corriere del Mezzogiorno, 29/08/2008. 
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Figure 25. People protest in Culiacan. 
Source: Brito F. 2014, ‘Protesters detained during pro-Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman rally in 
northern Mexico’, Indipendent UK, 03 March, <www.independent.co.uk> 
Figure 26. #CDS. 
Source: www.twitter.com 
Despite this cultivation of a moral and symbolic level, through which the 
outlaws claim their rightness and their social role, an efficient mythologizing process 
lies in the way criminal organizations link themselves to capitalist development, un- 
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derlying their capabilities as the most successful local enterprise. The boss Michele 
Zaza was used to affirm that he was called ‘the Gianni Agnelli of Naples’, because 
he created the bigger cigarette smuggling network of the 1970s, transforming con- 
traband for Naples in what Fiat was to Turin at that time. With a principle similar to 
that of the humanisation-moralisation of violence, even  the most bloodthirsty 
’Ndrangheta criminal activities have been mythologized as the basis of regional de- 
velopment. An example is the kidnappings during the 70s and 80s, when the 
’Ndrangheta decided to collect through hundreds of ransoms the financial capital 
necessary to transform family clans of former peasants and shepherds into multi- 
national, multi-millionaire enterprises (Ciconte 2008). One of the biggest neigh- 
bourhoods in Bovalino, close to Reggio Calabria, is still informally called the ‘Paul 
Getty quarter’, from the name of the American billionaire’s nephew whose ransom 
gave job and housing to hundreds of disenfranchised Calabrians. 
It’s interesting to observe that these two Italian vignettes are still generally 
well-known, but evoked as expressions of a ‘golden age’ in which criminal organiza- 
tions would have been autocratic but stable, rooted and paternalistic – ‘Keynesian’, 
we would say – powers. Even in the more eulogistic talks, contemporary criminal 
organizations are more represented as successful competitors in the global market- 
place. We can observe here a shift from the topic of solidarity to market concerns: 
their ability as businessmen and their efficient money-making endeavour would be 
enough to make new criminals legitimate. We have already shown it at the very be- 
ginning of this paragraph (Fig. 17). Matteo Messina Denaro, the invisible leader of 
Cosa Nostra in the last decades, cannot explicitly show himself as Michael Franzese 
does in the USA: a fascinating and successful motivational speaker, as well as a rich 
philanthropist and devoted Christian.24 Despite that, many legends about his charac- 
ter as a charming seducer, lover of luxury and audacious businessman – quite dif- 
ferent from his Sicilian predecessors – still paint him as one of the richest and most 
famous fugitives in the world (Fig. 27). 
24 ‘Highest Paid Mafia Boss Tells the TRUTH About the Life’, YouTube page ‘Valutain- 
ment’, 18/01/2018, viewed 15/07/2018, https://youtu.be/5U-yqm9H_Sg [Video 13]. 
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Figure 27. Matteo Messina Denaro. 
Source: Informal circulation. Portrait based on a police facial composite 
5. The rhetoric of Sanctification
Not only humanised and mythological, the legitimisation of criminal or- 
ganization is also fielded on the realm of the sacred and transcendent. Sacred ico- 
nology is used to define, justify and signify a scenario in which criminals operate as 
protagonists and where a large part of the symbolic references – the secular and po- 
litical ones in particular – have lost much of their credibility and effectiveness. 
Religious images are for both criminals and for the rest of the population the pro- 
tagonists in rituals for divine protection, in domestic shrines and religious proces- 
sions. Besides conveying a feeling of belonging, the use of sacred images answers to 
a common feeling of insecurity and lack of control. In the process of criminal 
moralisation, religion is introduced through two parallel rhetorical movements we 
have already met, often convergent in practice. On the one hand, the organizations 
directly take over the religious code, declaring their compatibility and their role of 
sponsor. On the other hand, they bend religious and moral codes into shapes com- 
patible with their social position, establishing new cults and founding new ‘criminal 
religions’. 
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Figure 28. ‘FotoReportaje: Malverde’ – Portrait. Figure 29. Church in Tezontle. 
Photo  by  Frias  R  (2017).  Source:  Siempre!  Revista, 
www.siempre.mx 
Source: Informal circulation 
Both the Italian and the Mexican cases offer several examples of these two 
rhetorical processes. The whole ’Ndrangheta hierarchy rests on religiously inspired 
names, and the most important meetings among clans traditionally have taken place 
in the famous sanctuary of the Virgin Mary in Polsi, symbol of a long history of 
silence and connivance with religious ministers (Nicaso & Gratteri 2013). The crim- 
inal appropriation of religious symbolism sometimes encounters attempted re- 
sistance from Catholic institutions. For example, the bishop of Reggio Calabria re- 
cently suggested to the Pope a 10-year ban of godfathers during baptisms, as a way 
to hamper the use of this practice as a means for the bosses to spread their authori- 
ty through the religious links with the newborn generation.25 This intervention aims 
to put an end to the controversial accusation of connivance from the highest ranks 
of the Catholic Church. It implicitly declares that criminal institutions are no more 
accepted as part of the local ruling class, as Karol Józef Wojtyła did in 1993 toward 
Cosa Nostra in Sicily. In his well-known anathema, the Pope held a very different 
position to that held by, for example, Cardinal Ruffini during the Cold War, who 
25 ‘Italian archbishop calls for 10-year ban on godparents to thwart mafia’, The Guardian, 
01/07/2014, www.theguardian.com. 
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clearly affirmed that would be better to be mafiosi, ‘if they even exist’, than com- 
munists. 
In the Mexican case, an explicit religious legitimisation falls within the al- 
ready investigated frame of narco-philanthropy, for example through the funding of 
new Catholic churches. These churches stand out for their majesty and are attended 
not only by the criminals, who go there to be redeemed from their sins, but also by 
locals. Although the Catholic higher institutions fiercely deny condoning drug traf- 
ficking, on a local level some priests turn a blind eye for those who give important 
contributions, gaining in exchange forgiveness and public recognition. Among these 
churches there is one built by the former leader of the Z3 group of Las Zetas. 
Heriberto Lazcano, known for being deeply religious, will be murdered by Mexican 
soldiers in 2012; an armed command will later attack the morgue to take his body 
on a procession and give him the religious blessing. Outside the flashy facade of the 
church a plaque thanks the boss in the name of the priest and the community (Fig. 
29).26 During the anniversaries of his death many churches of the region celebrate 
him, and some narcomanta (messages left by a drug cartel) appear nears the cathe- 
drals.27 
In Italy, the Episcopal authority interrupted a particularly controversial 
public mass proposed on Christmas Eve by the priest of the small town of Grumo 
Appula in Puglia. The ceremony was in commemoration of Rocco Sollecito, a mafia 
underboss murdered in Canada some months before.28 In many different Italian 
contexts, the infiltration of criminal organizations in the traditional religious festivi- 
ties is well known (Dino 2008; Chirico 2012). For example, in 2016, in Valenzano (a 
26 Cabrera A & Zavala M, ‘La huella de El Lazca sigue en el Tezontle’, 24 Horas, 
02/02/2015, http://www.24-horas.mx. 
27 Poncho P, ‘Zetas cuelgan narcomanta en honor a Heriberto Lazcano por su aniversario 
luctuoso’, Columna Tamaulipas, 09/10/2015, www.columnatamaulipas.com. 
A memorial corrido is for example ‘Recordando Al Señor Lazcano’ by Los Cadetes De Linares; 
as a background the advice of a death commemoration in Tezontla; Youtube page 
‘Corridos de la raza’, 22/10/2016, viewed 15/07/2018, www.youtu.be/YvRZuGp33rA 
[Video 14]. 
28 Banti N, ‘Grumo, polemica per la Messa in onore del boss. Il parroco: “Spiritualmente 
unito ai familiari”’, Il quotidiano italiano, 25/12/2016, www.ilquotidianoitaliano.com. 
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village near Bari) the Buscemi family imprinted its own name on the hot-air balloon 
traditionally launched during the local Patron Saint celebrations.29 The practice of 
‘bowing’ is a frequent phenomenon: during the procession for the Patron Saint, the 
statue of the Saint is stopped for a bow in front of the house of who usually offers 
generous donations. The local boss is usually one of them. Recent cases are those 
that have taken place in Oppido Mamertina in Calabria, in the Ballarò neighbour- 
hood in Palermo, and in Paternà, where the music band accompanied the religious 
procession by playing the soundtrack of The Godfather. The soundtrack was also 
used in Rome during the funerals of the boss of Casamonica, a mafia family. They 
organized a funeral-show with luxury cars, golden coaches, helicopters dropping 
rose petals and posters at the entrance of the church defining him as the ‘King of 
Rome’ and honouring him with ‘You conquered Rome, now you will conquer the 
Heavens’ (Fig. 30).30 Therefore, rather than a traditional religious context, in this ex- 
ample the ritual device of funeral (already influenced by Sinti traditions) not only 
blessed criminal acts, but has been rearticulated as a criminal ritual. 
Even more impressive is the transfiguration of religious codes operated by 
Mexican organizations. On the bodies of murdered and arrested narcos we see im- 
ages of Christ, of the Virgin of Guadalupe (the official national religious symbol) 
and other saints. Their objectification in image is a fundamental divine medium, in a 
complex form of worshipping that historically already belonged to the Latin Amer- 
ican context (Gruzinski 1988). Some of the most important popular cults of saints 
in Mexico are recognised neither by the Church nor by the State, and have strong 
links with the criminal world (Dahlin & Morfot 2011). 
29 Russi F, ‘Bari, il nome del clan sulla mongolfiera per il patrono. Ginefra (Pd): “Il Vimina- 
le intervenga”’, La Repubblica, 17/08/2016, www.bari.repubblica.it. 
30 ‘Funerale   di   Vittorio   Casamonica’,   Youtube,   20/08/2015,   viewed   17/07/2018, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=L-Dzw4CJvH8 [Video 15]. 
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 Source: www.larepubblica.it 
Jesus Malverde, a bandido social of the late nineteenth century represented 
in busts with whiskers and a white jacket, is a widespread cult derived from a popu- 
lar tradition of northern Mexico. He corresponds to stereotype of the good thief 
already seen in processes of mythologi- 
Figure 30. Vittorio Casamonica’s funeral. 
zation and criminals often dedicate a no- 
vena [prayer] to him before their en- 
deavours. Considered the protector of 
those who live off activities on the edge 
of legality, he is the Patron of Narcos 
(Fig. 31).31 That of  Santa Muerte, por- 
trayed as a skeleton in the guise of the 
Virgin Mary, is a popular cult that is see- 
ing an expansion all over Mexico (Per- 
digòn 2008; Hernández 2016). Its deity 
is functional to the symbolic manage- 
ment of the relationship between death, 
life and violence, which in their sacred 
representations are  intrinsically  united 
as they are in the Mexican neighbour- 
hoods (Gaytán Alcalá 2008; Lara Mireles 2008) (Fig. 32). These saints are carried in 
processions and they are often represented in urban and domestic shrines and in 
narco-altars, where they receive smoke  offerings, food and beverages (Chesnut 
2012); their presence in the virtualized religious space is no less strong (Lovheim & 
Linderman 2005; Gervasi et al. 2014) (Fig. 33, 34). Like every effective ritual object, 
their image can answer to different needs, invoked by both the criminals and by 
those seeking protection from them. The control over the local territory allows in 
some cases the presence of memorial altars for criminals in public spaces. In addi- 
tion to several murals in some of the popular neighbourhoods in the centre of Na- 
31     ‘Novena   de   Malverde’,   Youtube   page   ‘Jesus   Malverdee’,   16/03/2009,   viewed 
15/07/2018, https://youtu.be/pZUqnAe2dPk [Video 16]. 
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ples, a courtyard hosts since 2015 a bust of Emanuele Sibillo, surrounded by flow- 
ers and sacred images. 
Figure 31. ‘Santa Muerte’. Figure 32. ‘FotoReportaje: 
Malverde’ – Ofrendas. 
Photo by Frias R (2017). Source: 
Siempre! Revista, www.siempre.mx 
Photo by Schwarz S (2009). Source: Animal Politico, 
<www.animalpolitico.com> 
Figure 33. Novena de Malverde. 
Figure 34. Invoking the White La- 
dy’s protection. 
Source: www.youtube.com Source: www.twitter.com 
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The Mexican case offers an even clearer example of criminal canonization: 
the direct sanctification of a murdered narcotrafficker. In the case of Nazario 
Moreno Gonzàles, called El Loco or El Chayo, it is the criminal himself  who be- 
comes  an  object  of 
Figure 35. San Naza. 
Source: Calderon V 2014, ‘El capo que “murió” dos veces’, El Pais, 
03 November, <www.elpais.com> 
devotion. When in
2010 the Familia Mi- 
choacana organiza- 
tion ended in car- 
nage, their successors 
Los Caballeros Tem- 
plarios [The Tem- 
plars] gave them- 
selves a strict moral 
code and linked their 
rise to the  devotion 
of   San  Naza,  who 
seems capable of resurrections and miracles. This new cult soon extended to the lo- 
cal population and keeps expanding further (Sullivan & Bunker 2012). Today El Lo- 
co, represented in the guise of a Templar knight, has entered the Pantheon of the 
folk-saints, and his main oracle hosts a statue covered in gold and gems (Fig. 35).32 
Some elements suggest soon it could be the same, for example, for Heriberto 
Lazcano.33 
6. Criminal humanitarianism and political responsibility. Intersecting vision
and praxis 
The visual repertoire analysed here cannot be exhaustive about the possi- 
ble rhetorical devices and about the heterogeneities between regional contexts and 
32 Castellanos FJ, ‘El Chayo, santo patrono de la Tierra Caliente’, Proceso, 04/08/2012, 
www.proceso.mx. 
33 Chávez A, ‘Catedral de la Muerte suma a El Lazca a la veneración’, La Silla Rota, 
05/06/2017, www.lasillarota.com. 
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between criminal organizations. However, an examination of these constantly 
growing iconographic procedures provides – in a field in which social analysis suf- 
fers methodological impasses and lacks reliable data – some preliminary hypotheses 
on the cultural procedures criminal non-state actors in state contexts can use to le- 
gitimate themselves. The articulation of these discourses acts as a regulatory mech- 
anism not just for criminals; the alternative morality spreads out from the criminal 
context and can become a cultural point of reference, redefining what is human, 
moral and sacred even for others. If crime is, as already stated by Durkheim in 
1893, a deviant behaviour that goes against social norms, it is interesting to notice 
how crime can build through its representation new norms, permeating the com- 
munity and its folklore to the point that it is often problematic to identify where 
one ends and the other begins. This onset of new collective representations makes 
the criminals less criminal and, as we have seen in the last examples, these organiza- 
tions can even turn the institutional hierarchy upside-down, putting the criminal ac- 
tivity at the highest rank of a consecrated morality. This starts from the everyday 
practice of blurring the meaning of the word ‘justice’ not only into the attempt to 
make a living, but also into the attempt to legitimise that living to oneself and oth- 
ers (Garland 2001; Goldstein 2010).The social meaning of these visuals changes in 
relation to a political process that has two faces. From one side, the development of 
marginal grey zones, characterised by a deficit of institutional control and legit- 
imacy. On the other side, the growing hybridity between criminal enterprises and 
ruling classes. 
The visual examples here say a lot especially about the building of consent 
at the margins, while much remains to be said about criminal influence over the 
very centre of formal politics. This theoretical challenge would be as important as 
the one first mentioned, not only because it encompasses of a recent and more dif- 
fused phenomenon (Naim 2012), but for the specificity of the two regional con- 
texts we chose. With different modalities, these criminal organizations have worked 
since decades (or centuries, in some cases) as states within the state, moving on the 
line between the ‘upperworld’ and the ‘underworld’. The history of the Italian ma- 
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fias and Mexican cartels is not only that of criminals as creators of disorder, but al- 
so of the creation of criminal forms of public order (Solís González 2012; Sales 
2015); forms that are continuously adapted in order to fit the changing political pat- 
terns. 
Figure 36. ‘12D’ series. 
Photo by Gama F (2012). In Cubas 2013. 
In the three rhetorical procedures analysed – three conceptual categories 
whose borders are in practices within a flux of continue dialectics – the common 
effect is that a traditional ultimate factor of social disintegration actually seems to 
be a means of socialisation. If these organizations relate to popular areas strategi- 
cally managing an economy based on marginality – taking people ‘with hats in their 
hand’, using a mafia expression – in local imaginaries criminals provide jobs, do 
good deeds and, in short, look humanitarian, a productive and reconstructive organ 
of society. In the picture observed, criminals propose themselves as upholders of 
order. As we have seen, this mechanism can be effective and ‘humanising’ even 
when they promote an order explicitly built upon violence. In philanthropic repre- 
sentations we have two further and convergent images: criminal power as a pro- 
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moter of social solidarity and the powerless subalterns ready for self-empowerment 
through integration in the criminal market. Through philanthropic performance, as 
well as through the violent one, criminal patterns – and now, indirectly, neoliberal 
ones – are accepted, devised for addressing the same problems criminality and vio- 
lent economies are responsible for. Thus, we can look at these visuals ideologically, 
as informal devices to symbolise power relationships through a spectacularised mo- 
rality – also relevant to the specific local cultures – that shows ‘goodness’ in differ- 
ent forms, leaving untouched the question of the perpetuation of suffering through 
a structural and systemic violence. 
Beyond moral imperatives, the occultation of concrete social mechanisms 
is closely tied to a total disdain for the problem-solving ability of politics, that wid- 
ens the proximity between criminality and population and leaves to criminal organi- 
zations space for being recognised as philanthropic, moral and saint. These rhetori- 
cal processes are particularly effective when the state is unable to oppose equally ef- 
fective narratives, acting in forms that seem aimed at ‘punishing the poor’ and de- 
fending private interests (Waqcuant 2009). Unprecedented sympathies and ‘logics of 
equivalence’ (Laclau 2000) are created by the disdain for a political order considered 
to be responsible for poverty and hardship. It would be unsurprising, for example, 
to see an anti-globalist parade passing near the city’s jail – during a G7 meeting in 
the city-centre of Bari, sealed off for the occasion – playing and singing for inmates 
the well-known neo-melodic song D’int à sta cella [Inside this cell]. The same state 
discourse can legitimate an exotic and culturalistic vision of criminality, replacing its 
strict liabilities with references to a presumed traditional attitude. It recently hap- 
pened in Italy, when the very president of the anti-mafia’s Parliamentary Commis- 
sion Rosy Bindi described Camorra as a ‘constitutive aspect of the Neapolitan 
city’.34 On the other side, public speech that postulates the local populations as a si- 
lenced victim of criminal dominance risks to be simplistic and misleading too. As 
stated by Rakopoulos (2017) in his research on Cosa Nostra and the cooperatives in 
34 ‘La camorra è un dato costitutivo di Napoli. L’accusa della Bindi fa infuriare De Magi- 
stris’, La Stampa, 15/09/2015, www.lastampa.it. 
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Sicily, criminal organizations can be able to form a ‘centauric relation’ with society, 
maintaining a liminal position between coercion and consent, practices of hierarchy 
and claims to equality. The moral code of criminal honour, for example, even if far 
from being realised as their violence is, spreads the message that they can afford 
sustenance, peace, model of success. The compliant subjects can adopt them in or- 
der to create wealth; although fatal for dissenters, criminals could build a new politi- 
cal economy. 
In the rhetorical processes we have observed, criminals can both vindicate 
their peculiar – usually romanticised – outlaw’s identity and nurture an ‘one of us’ 
narrative. From opposite starting points, criminal promotion can bring something 
legitimate closer to criminals, or make what is criminal more legitimate. Both these 
visual representations transfigure reality, developing spatial practices and cultural 
models that soon become part of a broader social phenomenon (Barthes 1964; De 
Certau 1980). The case in which these visuals are effective means of promotion 
suggests that we should not oversize the distance between criminals and its audi- 
ence, nor undersize the political precondition of this proximity. Despite the dra- 
matic hierarchies imposed by violence and intimidation, the rhetoric analysed can’t 
be seen through the mechanical logic of persuasion. As we have seen, every legiti- 
mising process stems from forms of communication and cultural appropriation 
that, although asymmetrically, are based on a double movement which always fore- 
sees reciprocity. Cultural products seek to proliferate in a shared symbolic field, 
working towards the production of a recognised discourse about the social world 
that is meaningful – and therefore legitimate – for both. 
Fear, violence and uncertainty of social interactions are abundant in the 
criminal word as in the broader world of who live in social contexts of politically 
planned insecurity every day. Despite any rhetorical, iconological and media sophis- 
tication in criminal representation, the most direct legitimating idiom thus resides – 
more than in charity, honour or sanctity – in this shared social experience of insecu- 
rity (Fig. 37, 38). The cultural management of insecurity moves from criminal social 
interactions to even worships, becoming a transcendental form of interpretation of 
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reality. Ready in turn to build new rhetorical devices, the embodiment of criminal 
culture is part of a broader process of cultural elaboration. The subjectivities of 
who lives at the margins are far from being just passive products of subjugating de- 
vices; they stem from the informal interstices of the political structure not only as a 
disenfranchised product of the society-building processes, but as a way of adapting 
to their political failure. 
Figure 37. ‘I due Cristi’. Figure 38. ‘Historias en la piel’ series. 
Photo  by  Battaglia  L  (1982).  In 
Tamburrino 2016 
Photo by Gama F (2011). In Gama & Mendoza 2011 
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